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Employing survey and archival data from a sample of IPO firms, and extending the ideas
of the Behavioral Agency Model, this study examines the influence of various forms of risk
bearing created within the compensation contract on perceived risk taking. The results show that
employment risk and variability in compensation each corresponds to greater risk taking, while
downside risk and the intrinsic value of stock options correspond to lower risk taking. Among
the implications from these results are the importance CEOs attach to relatively stable forms of
pay, and to drawing distinctions between the potential for loss of pay and uncertainty about the
amount of future pay. Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In response to both a growing debate over the
influence of contingent pay on CEO behavior (see
Beatty and Zajac, 1994) and the lack of consis-
tent empirical findings regarding the association
between CEO compensation and firm performance
(see Gomez-Mejia, 1994), Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia (1998) developed the Behavioral Agency
Model (BAM). Their theory of executive compen-
sation combines elements of agency theory with
behavioral views of decision making under uncer-
tainty in order to re-examine what is meant by
compensation risk and how this risk influences
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executive behavior. Central within their model are
the concepts of risk bearing and risk taking.
This study extends their model in several ways.
First, beginning with their definition of agent risk
bearing as perceived loss of wealth, we reflect on
what is meant by wealth in the context of compen-
sation design and argue against viewing all income
as fungible. Second, we explore two sources of
risk bearing—compensation risk and employment
risk—in order to show how their influences on
agent risk preferences differ. Viewing agent risk
bearing as the potential for loss of wealth also
leads us to argue for a distinction between risk
bearing as downside loss and uncertainty regard-
ing future pay (see Miller and Leiblein, 1996).
Although compensation research has given consid-
erable attention to the degree of uncertainty about
future pay, we suggest that uncertainty about pay
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has an effect on agent risk preferences independent
of the potential loss of pay. Finally, we offer an
approach to capturing risk preferences as reflected
in a firm’s strategic initiatives that encompasses
both the actions taken and the decision-maker’s
perception of risk in taking those actions. Cap-
turing the decision-maker’s assessment of risk is
critical to distinguishing between intentional and
unintentional risk taking, and distinguishes this
measure from proxies that focus on a single action
that may or may not be perceived as risky.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Compensation researchers generally equate unpre-
dictability of future earnings (with measures such
as the proportion of variable pay in the pay pack-
age) with agent risk bearing (see Gomez-Mejia
and Wiseman, 1997, for a review). The behavioral
agency model challenges this view by suggest-
ing that agent ‘risk bearing’ only occurs when
there is a threat to the agent’s wealth. Under
BAM, pay is divided into essential and nonessen-
tial elements depending on its reliability. Pay
which is consistently paid over time, such as base
salary, is likely to be used to support one’s stan-
dard of living. Conversely, pay that is inconsis-
tently received over time, such as the amount
one might realize from exercising stock options
in any one year due to fluctuations in the stock
price, is unlikely to be used to support basic liv-
ing expenses (such as paying the mortgage) pre-
cisely because it is an unreliable source of income
from one period to the next. Hence, according to
BAM, only anticipated essential pay (which pre-
sumably is highly reliable) is likely to be endowed
by agents as part of their wealth (Strahilevitz,
1992).
While base pay is widely regarded as reliable
going forward (e.g., lending of 30-year home mort-
gages are based on this assumption), there is still
some uncertainty surrounding the precise amount
of future base pay which results in uncertainty
about the buying power of that pay to support or
raise one’s standard of living. On the one hand,
agents may face temporary or permanent changes
in pay structure (as has been the case in much
of the airline and automobile industry in recent
years). More often, however, uncertainty about
future base pay reflects variance in cost-of-living
increases, market adjustments, and merit pay raises
over time. Uncertainty about the size of these
upward adjustments may create uncertainty about
the ability of base pay to maintain or even raise
one’s standard of living. Mandatory renegotiation
clauses of base pay at stipulated intervals (nor-
mally every 3–5 years), which are often included
in executive compensation contracts, compounds
this uncertainty. In addition, some forms of pay,
such as annual cash bonus awards, which are often
classified as variable, exhibit considerable con-
sistency from year to year. Although the precise
bonus amount awarded from one year to the next
may vary, there is often sufficient consistency in
these payments over time to create the impres-
sion of reliability, while still carrying a degree of
uncertainty about the precise amount. This point
challenges prior research on compensation which
has generally classified pay into discrete categories
of ‘fixed’ and ‘variable.’ Instead, our argument
erases this arbitrary distinction and suggests that
all forms of pay are subject to some level of
uncertainty. Understanding the role of this uncer-
tainty on risk preferences may be best considered
by examining the research on decision making
under uncertainty (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman,
1992).
A considerable amount of research on choice
behavior has generally found that risk preferences
are strongly influenced by the framing of prospects
as gains or loss and the probabilities attached
to those anticipated gains and losses (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Wakker, 1995;
Wakker, 2003). This pattern has been observed in
numerous studies (see meta-analysis by Kühberger,
1998). Corresponding to this research, individuals
facing a loss of wealth become increasingly risk
seeking as the probability of the loss rises. Con-
versely, individuals anticipating a gain to wealth
become increasingly risk averse with increases in
the probability of anticipated gains (see Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). Since individuals tend to
weigh losses more than equivalent gains, the more
assured an anticipated gain is perceived, the less
willing individuals are to risk that gain in pursuit
of additional wealth. A key implication of these
findings is that individuals often willingly sacri-
fice significant upside potential in order to protect
highly probable gains (Kühberger, 1998).
Given that essential pay is presumably assured
relative to other forms of compensation, we expect
individuals to frame essential pay in the realm
of gains. The variability over time of previously
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awarded essential pay is likely to be a barometer
for future variability and thus reflects the inverse of
the probability of receiving essential pay. If essen-
tial pay is relatively stable (e.g., increases with
inflation every year or keeps up with ‘going labor
market rates’ as obtained from periodic salary sur-
veys; Gomez-Mejia,1992), agents are more prone
to view the value of such future pay as highly
probable and vice versa. This logic corresponds
to behavioral research on choice behavior, which
finds that the probability (or conversely the vari-
ability) surrounding future gains does influence
risk propensity (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman,
1990; Tversky and Wakker, 1995).
Conceptually, variability combines both the
potential losses to compensation as well as poten-
tial gains. This creates a potential conflict between
the motivation to protect against downside loss
through conservative behavior, and the incentive
to take full advantage of upside potential through
maximizing behavior. However, assuming individ-
uals weigh potential losses more than equivalent
gains (Tversky and Wakker, 1995), then they may
be more inclined to protect highly probable gains
rather than seek to increase the size of those gains.
Conversely, when gains are less certain, individu-
als may be more inclined to maximize anticipated
gains by taking on more risk. Thus, assuming
that the perceived variability in essential compen-
sation reflects the probability of anticipated pay,
higher variability in essential pay will correspond
to greater risk seeking in making decisions on
behalf of the firm.
Hypothesis 1: Variability of essential compen-
sation should exhibit a positive association with
CEO risk taking.
In addition to variability, essential pay also faces
downside risk. For example, if cash bonuses are
paid consistently during extended munificent eco-
nomic periods (such as in the United States during
the 1990s) recipients may attach an expectation of
reliability to these bonus payments, creating the
characteristics of essential pay that is then used to
support one’s standard of living. If so, deteriorating
economic conditions or firm performance might
lead to the loss of these awards. If recipients recog-
nize this possibility, they may anticipate the loss of
this pay separately from perceptions of uncertainty
about the size of future payments. Thus, downside
risk is distinguished from variability in that it cap-
tures the potential for losing something of value,
while variability captures fluctuations in the future
size of that value. Recognizing this distinction cor-
responds to behavioral research on choice behavior
(Tversky et al., 1990; Wakker, 2003).
Clearly threats to some portion of essential pay
(or anticipated raises in this pay) are likely to be
especially salient since its loss represents a threat
to one’s standard of living. When recent experi-
ence leads CEOs to perceive increased threats to
this pay, we would expect them to seek ways to
reduce this risk exposure. This prediction corre-
sponds to arguments suggested by Shapira (1995),
who proposes that executives tend to focus on
the loss potential of an outcome distribution when
considering alternative courses of action. Thus,
downside risk exposure to essential pay corre-
sponds to the potential of losing a portion of
pay critical to maintaining the executive’s stan-
dard of living. This risk exposure may result from
a variety of sources, including exogenous factors
such as an economic downturn and the execu-
tive’s own missteps. This differs from loss con-
texts in which executives anticipate losing wealth
and thus seek to reverse this anticipated loss
through risk-seeking actions (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979). Downside risk in the realm of gains
represents a possibility of a loss that could be
reduced by avoiding actions that would aggravate
this risk. In particular, we predict that percep-
tions of downside pay risk are likely to encourage
risk aversion in the selection of firm strategy in
order to limit this potential threat to anticipated
pay viewed as essential by the executive. For-
mally:
Hypothesis 2: Downside risk of essential com-
pensation negatively associates with CEO risk
taking.
A related but different source of CEO’s risk
bearing, and hence influence on CEO behavior,
is employment risk. Several authors (e.g., Berger,
Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Bloom and Milkovich,
1998) have noted the influence that a CEO’s
employment risk may exert on the CEO’s subse-
quent behavior, since the threat of dismissal seri-
ously jeopardizes the CEO’s future income (Fama,
1980; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). For one, the
taint of being fired can have a negative effect on
reputation and thus can seriously threaten future
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prospects (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Agrawal and
Mandelker, 1987). For example, Mehran, Nogler,
and Schwartz (1998) observe that only a few CEOs
are able to find a comparable position after pre-
siding over the liquidation of a firm. Put another
way, the anticipated rent for the CEO due to
the employment relationship decreases as employ-
ment risk increases. Analogously, Eckbo and Thor-
burn (2003) document large income losses of
CEOs of bankruptcy-filing firms vis-à-vis CEOs of
nonbankruptcy-filing firms. Thus, employment risk
represents an even more severe threat to wealth
than either form of compensation risk.
Although Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998)
do not delve into the specific mechanism linking
employment risk to agent risk taking, we can
construct an argument regarding employment risk
based on their discussion of risk bearing. From
BAM’s perspective loss contexts reduce an agent’s
risk bearing, thereby promoting greater risk taking
(see Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Since termination
results in the complete loss of all current income
and puts in serious jeopardy all future income,
employment risk represents the ultimate threat to
a CEO’s wealth. This is likely to compound a
loss context for the CEO. Consistent with BAM’s
view that anticipated losses can trigger increased
risk taking, we would expect CEOs to respond
energetically to perceived increases in employment
risk by augmenting their preference for risk. This
view corresponds to research on choice behavior
regarding risk such that, as the probability of
loss increases, individuals tend to increase their
risk-taking behavior (Tversky and Wakker, 1995).
Formally stated:
Hypothesis 3: Employment risk exhibits a posi-
tive association with risk taking.
Nonessential pay includes a variety of forms (e.g.,
equity vs. cash) each having different character-
istics. The most common form,1 stock options,
represents a special class of contingent compen-
sation with unique properties not found in other
long-term incentive pay. Practitioners and schol-
ars alike have long defended that stock options
may be an efficient way to align the interests
1 Although restricted stock is becoming increasingly popular
(45% of CEOs in 2005 received restricted stock awards), stock
options remain the most popular form of stock-based pay (in
2005 75% of CEOs received stock options).
of CEOs with those of shareholders (e.g., Fama
and Jensen, 1983). This occurs since options
directly link a portion of CEO wealth to the
stock price of the firm (Haugen and Senbet, 1981;
DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990), while simul-
taneously limiting the CEO’s downside exposure
relative to that of equity ownership (Sanders,
2001). If the firm’s stock price rises (regard-
less of cause), the CEO’s options gain in value,
while falling stock prices reduce option value
but not actual CEO wealth (since, unlike stock
ownership, the CEO has invested no wealth into
the ownership of the option). As with contingent
pay in general, empirical examinations of stock
option influences on risk taking appear mixed and
inconclusive (see Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987;
Defusco et al., 1990; Defusco, Zorn, and John-
son 1991: Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Sanders,
2001).
BAM offers a new perspective to analyze the
role of stock options. Specifically, BAM stresses
the important role that the ‘intrinsic value’ of
unexercised stock options may play in determining
the risk-taking posture of the CEO. Building on
the concept of ‘instant endowment’ (Thaler and
Johnson, 1990), BAM defends that, regardless of
the source of that wealth creation (CEO induced
or the result of market fluctuations), the value of
options may be instantly endowed into calculations
of personal wealth. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia
(1998) argue that a portion of the current value of
positively valued stock options, like that of owned
stock, becomes part of perceived current wealth.
Stock options granted to a CEO normally have
an exercise price (determined on the day of the
grant) which determines the price at which the
CEO may purchase stock at some future date
(Hall, 2000). Due to this characteristic and to
the long-term horizon of stock option plans (nor-
mally 10 years according to Murphy, 1999), CEOs
should expect a high probability that their options
will finish with a positive pay-off with likeli-
hoods as high as 0.80 and higher in some stud-
ies (Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Hall
and Murphy, 2002). The probability of a pos-
itive pay-off would be even higher if we take
into account the possibility of repricing ‘underwa-
ter’ stock options. Buttressing these findings, the
business press reports that even in a bear market
CEOs of Fortune 500 firms consistently enjoy pos-
itive returns from these plans (Lavelle, Jespersen,
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and Arndt, 2002; Lavelle et al., 2003; Prasso and
Lavelle, 2003).
As option value rises we expect CEOs to incor-
porate this value into calculations of personal
wealth in anticipation of exercise. If true, then loss-
averse CEOs should prefer strategies that protect
option value over strategies that, while promising
increased option value (and thus increased wealth),
also increase the chances of reducing this value.
Said another way, as the value of stock options
rises CEOs will pursue lower-risk strategies that
protect stock option value over value maximiz-
ing strategies that could place the current value
at increased risk.
Hypothesis 4: Unexercised, positively valued
stock options negatively associate with CEO risk
taking.
METHODS
Sample and data collection
Data for this study came from firms issuing an
initial public offering (IPO) of stock from 1993
to 1995. This sample is superior to typical ‘For-
tune 500’ samples for studying the influence of
compensation design on risk taking because IPOs
tend to show a wider range of risk which provides
greater variation in ‘key risk-bearing aspects of
management compensation contracts’ (Beatty and
Zajac, 1994: 315). Further, IPOs present a higher
dependence on CEO preferences. Smaller size and
less well-established organizational routines and
behaviors (in part because IPO firms are commonly
young; MacCrimmon and Martens, 1999) increase
the influence of the top management team and in
particular the CEO on organizational objectives
and strategic choices. Lastly, the theoretical notion
of essential vs. nonessential expenses apportioned
from one’s income may be more meaningful in this
sample. CEOs in our sample earn a median income
of $364,000 a year vs. an income of $10 million
plus among their counterparts in Fortune 500 firms
(Reingold, 2000).
The CEOs of the firms that went public in the
1993–95 period were surveyed during the third
and fourth quarters of 1998. Surveys of chief exec-
utive officers are notorious for low response rates,
often around 10 percent (see Matsuda, Vanderw-
erf, and Scarbrough, 1994; Welbourne and Wright,
1997). We took several steps to achieve the high-
est response rate possible (Forsythe, 1977; Fowler,
1993). First, we pretested the survey in order to
make the questionnaire more appealing and eas-
ier to complete. Next, we mailed the survey to
the CEOs of all 1184 firms issuing IPOs from
1993 through 1995. The survey was accompanied
by a cover letter that linked the current inves-
tigation with an ongoing series of studies being
conducted on IPO firms by a research team at
an Ivy League school in which many IPO firm
members had previously participated. Nonrespon-
dents were telephoned and mailed a second survey
within 40 days of receiving the first. 108 CEOs
eventually responded, giving us a response rate of
9.25 percent. This response rate is consistent with
previous studies involving IPO firms (Welbourne
and Wright, 1997).
Since nonresponse bias is a likely concern with a
low response rate, we conducted several statistical
comparisons between respondents and the popu-
lation. First, we compared the characteristics of
our sample against 5000 randomly drawn samples
of 108 firms each taken from the full IPO pop-
ulation. The empirical distribution derived from
these 5000 random samples allowed us to test the
hypothesis that our sample differed from a sam-
pling of truly random samples using the ‘percentile
method’ (Mooney and Duval, 1993). We found no
significant differences in firm sales, total assets,
number of employees, return on assets, return on
equity, earnings per share, long-term debt, or total
liabilities, which supports the random nature of our
sample. Second, we ran single mean pair compar-
isons for several known firm characteristics includ-
ing assets, number of employees, and revenues. We
found no significant differences between our sam-
ple and the population on any of these characteris-
tics. Third, using a χ 2 independence test we found
no differences in the distribution of SIC codes and
sales between our sample and the population of
IPO firms. Fourth, we ran a Kolmogorov–Smirnov
two-sample test to assess whether significant dif-
ferences exist in the distribution of respondents
and nonrespondents for all known variables (e.g.,
firm sales and ROA), including differences in cen-
tral tendency, dispersion, and skewness (Siegel and
Castellan, 1988). Again we found no significant
differences.
Finally, we considered the possibility that poten-
tial nonresponse bias may not be revealed by
testing for differences in firm characteristics, but
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instead in how CEOs responded. To check for
this, we ran two tests. Following recommendations
by Armstrong and Overton (1977), and Subramani
and Venkatraman (2003), we compared the sur-
veys of late responders to those who responded
early to our request. This test identified four signif-
icant differences at p ≤ 0.05 in the mean responses
between the early and late responders among 69
variables compared. In the other test we compared
responses between IPO years. That is, we com-
pared responses from CEOs whose IPO occurred
in one of the three years with the responses of
CEOs whose IPO occurred in each of the other
two years. Again, only a handful of items were
statistically different (falling within what would be
expected from chance) and showed no discernible
pattern. Based on this evidence we are reasonably
confident our sample is representative of the pop-
ulation.
The typical respondent in the sample was a 51-
year-old male, the CEO of the firm at the time
of the IPO and had more than 8 years’ experience
in the IPO firm. The final sample contained firms
from 49 industries at the two-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) level. No industry (two-
digit level) accounted for more than 17.5 percent
of the sample. Firm size ranged from 10 to 10,000
employees with an average size of 928, and a
median size of 337 employees.
Measures and analysis
This study combines archival with survey data.
Survey measures of risk taking and employment
risk were developed specifically for this study.
Archival data from firm proxy statements were
used to measure CEO age and compensation,
including pay and stock options. Financial infor-
mation (including firm performance, size, and so
forth) was obtained from Computstat and CRSP
data.
Risk taking
Risk taking reflects the CEO’s choice of invest-
ment risk from among the firms’ investment oppor-
tunity set. For this study, we are concerned with
measuring the degree of overall strategic risk a
CEO knowingly accepts when deciding to increase
or decrease investment in various strategic alter-
natives. In other words, we are concerned with
an overall risk profile resulting from the pursuit
or rejection of various strategic options available
to firms. It is our view that no single dimension
(such as R&D investment) can adequately cap-
ture overall risk propensity since CEOs have a
variety of alternatives from which to choose (e.g.,
acquiring other firms, entering new markets, devel-
oping new products), and their choice of a strategic
option may not be independent of other choices.
This is because increased use of one strategic
risk may be offset by reductions in other strategic
risks (see Wiseman and Catanach, 1997). Alterna-
tively, avoiding a risky strategic alternative may
not be due to risk aversion, but to limits in man-
agerial discretion regarding that alternative (Ham-
brick and Finkelstein, 1987). Finally, focusing on
a specific strategic alternative to measure risk tak-
ing presupposes that the decision-maker shares the
researcher’s assumption about the riskiness of the
alternative being measured. In other words, using
a specific strategic alternative ignores differences
in market power or industry conditions that could
influence actual (and thus perceived) risk to the
firm from any given strategic action. That is to
say, risk is likely to be idiosyncratic for each firm,
making universally applied indicators of strategic
risk misleading.
Broad firm-level measures of risk (such as vari-
ance in returns or in stock analysts’ forecasts) are
also problematic since these measures not only
capture the effects of strategic adjustments but also
the effects of exogenous industry factors (Palmer
and Wiseman, 1999). Thus, firm-level measures
of income uncertainty provide weak proxies of
strategic choices involving risk. To avoid these
problems we developed and validated a measure
of strategic risk that extends a measure developed
by Khandwalla (1977) and later used by Singh
(1986). Our approach avoids limiting the choice
of strategic actions to one or two options (which
may not be appropriate for all respondents), focus-
ing on the use of specific strategic alternatives
rather than on distal outcomes of these actions
such as income uncertainty, and, unlike Khand-
walla or Singh, allows respondents to determine
the riskiness of each strategic action to their busi-
ness (rather than imposing a universal standard
of risk). The latter is critical to capturing pref-
erences for risk since the only way to correctly
interpret whether an action is risk seeking or risk
avoiding is to determine whether the actor per-
ceived the action as risk increasing or risk decreas-
ing.
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Our measure of strategic risk combines six
strategic dimensions suggested by Khandwalla
(1977), along with several more strategic actions
firms may pursue based on a review of strat-
egy research and interviews with managers about
what strategic actions they took. These dimensions
were pretested on 69 members of an executive
MBA class at a leading university in the West-
ern United States. Our pretest revealed that a
subset of items were judged by a majority of
respondents as indicators of risk taking, were
consistently rated on the degree of their riski-
ness to the firm, and appear to capture different
aspects of risk taking as shown by exploratory
factor analysis. It confirmed our suspicion that
no single dimension would provide a good proxy
for capturing the firm’s strategic risk profile.
Based on these results, we selected nine items
to capture strategic risk: (a) R&D; (b) entry into
a new product-market; (c) manufacturing or pro-
cess innovation; (d) product innovation of an exist-
ing product; (e) capital investment in property,
plant, or equipment; (f) downsizing through lay-
offs; (g) increasing long-term debt; (h) acquisition
of a business in an unrelated industry;
(i) increasing promotion and advertising.
For the study, CEOs were asked to rate each
item on a seven-point scale (1 = very low risk;
7 = very high risk) ‘the extent of risk your firm
faces (e.g., if things do not turn out well, the strat-
egy could lead to major losses) from increasing
your investment in each strategic action.’ CEOs
were then asked to rate on a seven-point scale
(1 = never used; 7 = frequently used) the ‘extent
to which your firm engages (i.e., invests) in each
strategic action.’
Using a split-sample agreement procedure, we
found that two randomly drawn subsamples of
CEOs (N = 54 each) produced nearly identical
results in terms of the perceived riskiness of the
nine strategic actions. None of the differences
between the nine pairs of response means were
found to be statistically different between the two
random samples. Further, the correlation between
the subsample means for the nine items reached
0.91 (p ≤ 0.000). In other words, there was a
remarkably high degree of agreement among inde-
pendent CEO raters as to which strategic actions
were of higher or lower risk. This high inter-rater
agreement contrasts with the expectedly lower
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.51 for an intra-rater test of
inter-item reliability. The lower alpha coefficient is
not surprising in this case because it supports our
view that the nine items selected capture different
dimensions of strategic risk.2 To further check
on the discriminant validity of the nine items, a
mean comparison across items within each sub-
sample showed that most of the mean differences
between each item and every other item reached
statistical significance of at least p ≤ 0.05 (specif-
ically, 33 out of 36 inter-item mean comparisons
in subsample one, and 32 out of 36 inter-item
mean comparisons in subsample two). This indi-
cates that CEOs not only agreed on which actions
were riskier but also that they could clearly dif-
ferentiate between the relative risk of one action
vs. another (i.e., high discriminant validity). The
risk of various strategic actions, in descending
order of magnitude, are as follows: acquisition
of businesses in unrelated industries; entry into
new markets; downsizing through layoffs; capital
investment; increase long-term debt; increase pro-
motion and advertising; innovation of an existing
product; manufacturing or process innovation; and
R&D.3
Using these nine strategic actions we constructed
a composite index for each firm i to represent
CEO risk taking by multiplying the ‘usage’ score
for each strategic action j by its ‘risk’ score and
averaging these products across all nine items
(see formula). Composite measures are justified
when the construct of interest is at a macro level
of analysis, such as with group research where
the construct of interest may be an average of
uncorrelated individual scores (e.g., Stoner, 1968;
Chen, 1998) or when the indicator variables reflect
multiple dimensions or facets of a latent construct
(see Law and Wong, 1999), and thus are meant
to complement one another (Doz, Olk, and Ring,
2000; Jarvis, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff, 2003;
Boyd, Gove, and Hitt, 2005). Mathematically, this




(Usageij ∗ Riskij )/9
2 Such low Cronbach alpha values, between 0.5 and 0.6, are com-
mon for composites that approach multidimensional constructs.
See, for example, Khandwala (1977), Gupta and Govindarajan
(1984), Singh (1986), Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), or Van
de Ven and Ferry (1979).
3 Note that the low risk attributed to R&D conflicts with studies
that use R&D as a proxy for risk taking (e.g., Hoskisson, Hitt,
and Hill, 1992).
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Greater usage of high-risk actions produces a
higher value, while greater usage of lower-risk
actions or minimal usage of high-risk actions
produces a lower value. We report only the find-
ings pertaining to this risk-taking composite rather
than a fine-grain analysis of its constituent ele-
ments. Results examining individual constituents
(available from the authors) as well as three fac-
tors produced from a factor analysis of the nine risk
dimensions led to substantially lower model fit.
These findings suggest that a composite score pro-
vides a superior measure of overall strategic risk
posture than looking at any subset of risk dimen-
sions.
Downside risk of pay
We measure downside compensation risk as the
degree to which each of five forms of compen-
sation is at risk of loss. Borrowing an index of
pay used by Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), we
examine the downside risk to five types of compen-
sation: annual base salary; raises and adjustments
to base salary; annual cash bonuses; long-term cash
compensation (cash awards based on long-term
performance—more than one year); and long-term
non-cash compensation (stock-based awards based
on long-term performance—more than one year).
For each item we asked CEOs to indicate ‘the
extent to which each type of pay has faced a chance
of loss since the IPO.’ Responses were made on
a six-point scale (1 = no downside risk to my
pay; 6 = extremely high downside risk to my pay).
The split sample analysis, conducted in the same
manner as described earlier, shows that there is a
high degree of agreement as to the relative down-
side risk of the five types of compensation. None
of the differences among the five pairs of means
between two randomly drawn samples of equal
size (N = 54) reached statistical significance. The
correlation for the two sets of five means between
the two subsamples reached 0.978 (p < 0.001). On
the other hand, a pair comparison of the five sets
of means across the five items within each sam-
ple shows that all of the mean differences were
statistically significant, indicating high discrimi-
nant validity. The downside risk of the various pay
items in descending order are: long-term non-cash
compensation; bonuses; long-term cash compensa-
tion; adjustments to base pay; and base pay.
Next, we created a downside risk measure that
combines the downside risk ratings across the five
forms of compensation weighted by the allocation
of each k type of compensation. To gauge alloca-
tion, we asked CEOs to indicate the percentage of
each form of pay they devote to essential expenses,
savings and nonessential expenses (see Figure 1
for average percentage of pay devoted to essential
expenses). We then multiplied the percentage allo-
cated to essential expenses against the downside
risk score and summed these products across the
five types of pay to produce a downside risk to
essential pay index. The higher the value of this
index, the greater the risk to pay that is largely
devoted to essential expenses. Mathematically, the
formula appears:
Downside risk of essential payi =
5∑
k=1
(Allocation to essentialik ∗























Figure 1. Allocation of pay
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Variability of pay
Our measure of variability of pay is calculated sim-
ilarly to the downside risk measure. First, we asked
CEOs to indicate ‘the extent to which this pay item
has varied over the years since the IPO.’ Responses
were made on a six-point scale (1 = does not vary
from year to year; 6 = is extremely variable over
time; almost unpredictable). Just as in the case
of downside risk, the split-sample analysis shows
that the mean differences for the variability of
the five compensation elements are not statisti-
cally significant between the two randomly cho-
sen samples of 54 each. The correlation between
the two sets of means across the two samples
reached 0.99 (p ≤ 0.001). Within each sample, all
of the mean pair comparisons reached statistical
significance, indicating high discriminant validity.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and corre-
lations for downside risk and variability attributed
by respondents to each component of compensa-
tion using the scale described above. Differences
in the mean values and inter-item correlations indi-
cate that respondents saw these items differently
and did not equate downside risk with variability
in assessing each type of compensation.
The variability scores (for salary, annual
bonuses, and so forth) were then weighted by allo-
cation percentages and summed across k forms of
pay to create an index of variability of essential
pay. That is, we multiplied the allocation percent-
age (for essential expenses) by the variability score
for each type of pay and summed these products
to produce a variability of essential pay index. A
high score on this measure corresponds to high
variability in those elements of compensation that
are largely devoted to essential expenses. Mathe-
matically, the formula appears:
Variability of essential payi =
5∑
k=1
(Allocation to essentialik ∗
Variability of payik)
Perceived employment risk
We measure CEO employment risk using a survey
item which asked CEOs about threats to their
employment in recent years. Specifically, CEOs
indicated their agreement on a seven-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) to
the following statement: ‘There were years when
I believed my employment security was at risk.’
These answers were eventually recoded into a
dummy variable, where one indicates CEOs who
responded with ‘strongly agree’ to the statement,
and zero represents those who selected answers 1
through 6 on this scale. Our concentration on the
extreme case (those that chose ‘strongly agree’)
was to ensure that we had captured those for whom
termination was most likely. As March and Shapira
(1992) argue, and empirically demonstrated by
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), decision-makers are
most likely to shift their attention away from
success and toward the potential for failure when
their resource positions begin to move close to
failure.
For CEOs, the probability of termination is
firm specific and depends on a variety of fac-
tors, including firm performance, board indepen-
dence, and so forth. Since the person most likely
to have this knowledge is the CEO, we surveyed
the CEOs themselves. In support of the external
validation of this measure we found that responses
to this item were positively correlated (r = 0.282;
p-value = 0.004) with prior voluntary and invol-
untary CEO departures within the firm (Cough-
lan and Schmidt, 1985), with responses to a per-
formance target attainment question (r = 0.325;
p = 0.001) that asked CEOs to indicate the degree
to which he/she has failed to satisfy performance
targets contained within the compensation agree-
ment, and negatively with objective firm perfor-
mance as measured by average ROA (r = −0.490;
p-value = 0.000).
Options value
We measured the value of stock options held by
CEOs by taking the average value of options held
as reported in the firm’s proxy statement over
3 years (1995–97). 1995 was chosen as the first
year in the period since all IPOs occurred prior
to 1996. This captures the earliest year where a
majority of firms will have reported data. For firms
with less than 3 years of data, the average was
based on available data. Hence, some values are
based on 1 and 2 years of data. We calculated
the value of stock options by multiplying the
number of stock options held against the difference
between stock price and exercise price of options
at year-end. This calculation correlates with values
derived from the Black–Scholes method (Black
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and Scholes, 1973) at 0.921 (p < 0.001) and with
values obtained by valuing stock options at 25
percent of their exercise price (Lambert, Larcker,
and Weigelt, 1993) at 0.943 (p < 0.001).
Control variables
We controlled for CEO age, pay mix, firm size,
and firm performance in this study. A study by
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) revealed that
the only stable personal characteristic of CEOs
having a significant influence over risk preference
was age. Thus, we included CEO age, as reported
in the firm’s 1997 proxy statement. Pay mix was
measured by calculating the average proportion of
variable pay (i.e., short-term bonuses, restricted
stock awards, stock options, and long-term income
pay-outs) over total pay received by the CEO dur-
ing the period 1993–97 (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin,
1992). Only compensation received by the CEO
while holding the CEO position was included in
this calculation. Partial year compensation was
also excluded. On average, 35 percent of total com-
pensation is variable in nature, the same percentage
reported by Murphy (1999) for a large sample of
CEOs during a similar time period. Firm size was
measured using the log of average total assets held
by the firm during the 1992–97 period. Firm per-
formance is measured using average ROA for the
1992–97 period.
RESULTS
As displayed in Figure 1, a larger proportion of
fixed pay (pay with lower variability) is devoted to
essential expenses than high-variability pay (e.g.,
long-term, non-cash compensation options). This
finding is consistent with the logic of BAM that
less variable forms of pay are primarily used to
support one’s standard of living (defined as essen-
tial expenses), while more variable forms of pay
are not. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics
and correlation matrix for all variables used in
the study. As might be expected, we find reason-
ably strong correlations between the two aspects
of compensation risk: Downside risk of essential
pay is correlated with the variability of essential
pay (r = 0.687; p < 0.001). Given the strong cor-
relations between the variability in essential pay
and downside risk to essential pay we performed
a confirmatory factor analysis to see if these two
variables loaded on a single factor. The variables
loaded poorly on the same factor (less than 0.7),
supporting the discriminant validity between these
indicators.
Common method bias is a potential problem in
this sample since the major source of our data
comes from a single survey. To test for this possi-
bility, we first looked for common variance among
the survey items by examining the average corre-
lation between all the survey items. Average corre-
lation is 0.025 (0.047 if only survey items directly
related with IV and DV are considered). Those cor-
relations that are statistically different from zero
(11% of total correlations) are all consistent with
ex ante expectations. Second, as reported previ-
ously, inter-rater agreement between two random
subsamples on the riskiness of the nine items was
0.91. This result indicates considerable agreement
among independent raters on what is risky. If com-
mon method bias was present, we would expect
lower agreement among independent respondents
and a much higher level of inter-item correla-
tion for individual raters. In other words, common
method variance should be evidenced by a higher
Cronbach’s alpha and a lower inter-rater reliabil-
ity for the risk-taking items, yet we found just
the opposite. Finally, we conducted a confirma-
tory factor analysis of the survey measures to see
if they loaded on a single factor or multiple factors.
The five-factor model produced a better global fit
on all fit indices than the single-factor model (see
Table 3), suggesting that common method bias is
unlikely to create spurious results.
Test of hypotheses
Table 4 provides results from our test of hypothe-
ses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, variability of
essential pay (t = 4.228) exhibits a significant pos-
itive association with risk taking. As the variability
of essential pay declines, implying an increase in
the reliability or probability of this pay, strate-
gic risk taking decreases. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is
supported. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative asso-
ciation between downside risk of essential pay and
risk taking. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, down-
side pay risk exhibits a significant negative relation
to risk taking (t = −2.888). Perceived risk of los-
ing anticipated essential forms of pay corresponds
to lower strategic risk taking. Thus Hypothesis 2 is
supported. In order to test the robustness of these
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Table 3. Global model fit indexes







98.097 12 8.174 <0.001 0.259 0.805 0.471 0.481
Five-factor model 7.752 3 2.584 <0.051 0.122 0.977 0.971 0.973 90.345 9 <0.001
a Probability of observing a change in χ 2 greater than the reported ‘change in χ 2’, for a variable that follows a χ 2 distribution with
‘difference in d.f.’ degrees of freedom. Probabilities are stated in inequality terms as χ 2 tables are sparse.
Table 4. Influence of agent risk on risk taking (standardized coefficients with
t-tests in parentheses)
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2
CEO age −0.254(−2.413)∗ −0.317(−3.300)∗∗∗
Pay mix (variable/total pay) 0.039 (0.339) 0.154 (1.352)
Firm size (log assets) −0.059(−0.383) −0.011(−0.088)
Firm performance (ROA) −0.059(−0.471) 0.033 (0.278)
Variability of essential pay 0.577 (4.228)∗∗∗
Downside risk of essential pay −0.390(−2.888)∗∗
Employment risk 0.241 (2.346)∗
Value of stock options −0.326(−3.074)∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.239∗∗∗
Change in adjusted R2 0.206∗∗∗
N 108 108
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
findings, we also tested a model that included mea-
sures of the downside risk and pay variability of
both nonessential pay and savings pay. None of
these variables exhibited a significant association
with risk taking. Thus, only the variability and
downside risk exposure of essential pay influenced
risk propensity. Further, adding industry controls
does not alter the results reported in the paper.
None of the industry controls showed significant
coefficients.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that employment risk
would be positively associated with risk taking.
Our results support Hypothesis 3: employment
risk exhibited a positive association with risk
taking (t = 2.346). Consistent with Hypothesis 4
the value of unexercised stock options exhibits a
significant negative association with risk taking
(t-value = −3.074). The higher the value of unex-
ercised stock options, the less risk taking CEOs
exhibit. Thus Hypothesis 4 is supported.
Among the control variables, CEO age exhibited
a significant negative influence on CEO risk tak-
ing, a finding consistent with MacCrimmon and
Wehrung (1990). Neither firm performance nor
firm size exhibited a significant influence. Finally,
pay mix (the proportion of contingent pay in the
total compensation package) failed to exhibit a sig-
nificant association with risk taking.4
DISCUSSION
This study provides empirical support for the core
ideas contained in BAM (Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). Specifically, it supports the negative
association between stock options and risk taking,
the disaggregation of downside compensation risk
from variability, the importance of distinguishing
between employment risk and compensation risk,
and the lack of fungibility across different forms
of compensation. Overall our results are consis-
tent with the idea that decision-makers, CEOs in
this case, are loss averse, and thus seek to protect
personal wealth from potential losses (Kahneman
4 Tests for multicollinearity indicated that collinearity was not
influencing results. Specifically, the highest variance inflation
factor (VIF) found was 2.1 and the highest condition index (CI)
found was 20.
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and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986;
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) but may also
take greater risks when faced with loss. This
implies that CEO risk preferences may be non-
static and that models which assume consistent
risk preferences, particularly risk aversion, appear
to lack predictive accuracy. Finally, our model
approached the measurement of risk taking from
the perspective of the risk-taker by including their
assessment of the risk produced from each action
taken. Further, by creating a composite measure of
firm risk, we recognize that a firm’s strategic risk
profile results from multiple independent actions
that when combined can accentuate or moderate
overall risk exposure (see Wiseman and Catanach,
1997).
Implications
Several behavioral implications emerge from this
study. Primary among them is the role of CEOs’
loss aversion regarding their standard of living
in determining their firms’ risk posture. In par-
ticular, our results suggest that protection by the
CEO of those portions of compensation largely
devoted to essential expenses (and thus assumed
critical to one’s standard of living), and which are
viewed as stable over time, may play a funda-
mental role in determining the firm’s risk posture.
Further, contrary to normative agency-based argu-
ments (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987), vari-
ability of compensation does not deter risk taking
but appears to enhance risk taking. Collectively,
these findings support the BAM view of executive
compensation, and thereby challenge traditional
models that rest on assumptions of uniform risk
aversion.
Among the more interesting findings of our
study is that the value of CEO stock options
is negatively associated with risk taking. Tradi-
tional views of compensation design tend to hold
that stock options promote alignment between
the interests of agents and those of principals.
For example, Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfelt
(1985) observed that as the amount of CEOs’
ownership in their firm increased, they were less
likely to make merger bids that would lower
their stock prices. This association was interpreted
as supporting the notion that stock-based com-
pensation (e.g., stock options) effectively aligns
CEO and shareholders’ interests. However, it is
a long leap from observing wealth preservation
to attributing intentions of wealth maximization.
Furthermore, Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989),
Lavelle et al. (2002, 2003), or Decarlo (2003)
report evidence that, at least, asks for a deeper
thought on the long-cited capacity of stock-based
compensation to align CEO and shareholders’
interests. Specifically, Lambert et al. (1989) empir-
ically demonstrated that the adoption of stock
option plans reduced corporate dividends. Given
the negative effect that granting dividends has on
stock price, this evidence supports the hypothesis
of wealth protection. In addition, others (Healy,
1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995) have
observed similar responses to other types of con-
tingent compensation (e.g., annual bonuses). Also
in a study of the ownership and performance con-
sequences of the exercise of CEO stock options,
McGuire and Matta (2003) put into question the
incentive alignment properties of stock options.
All these results are consistent with Wiseman and
Gomez-Mejia’s (1998) idea that CEOs seek to pro-
tect current wealth, even if this means forfeiting
potentially higher income.
The positive association between pay variability
and risk taking provides additional evidence of loss
aversion. Specifically, as the variability of essential
pay declines, presumably CEOs sense less uncer-
tainty about its future award and will seek ways to
protect this anticipated pay by lowering the level
of risk they accept in making strategic choices.
Conversely, when essential pay is highly variable,
executives may perceive less risk to wealth (less
risk bearing) since they see this pay as less likely
to be awarded. This finding refines BAM’s pre-
dictions regarding endowment of essential pay by
suggesting that CEOs may be less likely to endow
future pay into calculations of personal wealth
when they see the award of that pay as less cer-
tain. This finding corresponds to prospect theory
predictions that, as the probability of a future gain
increases, decision-makers generally become risk
averse in order to protect these anticipated addi-
tions to wealth.
By contrast, we find a negative association
between downside risk to essential pay and risk
taking. Though pay variability may represent the
certainty or reliability of future essential pay,
downside risk represents only the potential for los-
ing some portion of future pay that is already
viewed as reliable. As threats to anticipated essen-
tial pay emerge, CEOs appear to lower the risk
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profile of the firm in order to reduce the risk of los-
ing some portion of anticipated pay. These actions
may reflect an attempt to counterbalance environ-
mental factors that threaten the award of future pay
(see Palmer and Wiseman, 1999), or an attempt
to avoid mistakes that could exacerbate the poten-
tial loss of anticipated income (March and Shapira,
1992).
Possibly even more important than the differ-
ence between downside risk and variability is the
difference between pay used for different purposes.
It is traditional in economic models of compen-
sation to assume pay is fungible in all its forms
regardless of type, risk, or source. That is, compen-
sation recipients make no distinctions between the
sources of pay and may use them indiscriminately
in satisfying their primary needs. Our research
suggests a very different picture of how different
forms of pay are perceived, used, and thus treated.
In particular, we find that stable forms of pay are
primarily used for maintaining one’s standard of
living, while less reliable forms of pay are largely
devoted to nonessential expenses and savings. Dif-
ferences in allocation appeared to have implica-
tions for risk taking, which suggests that CEOs
may have differential concerns for these different
forms of pay. That is, CEOs appear to be more con-
cerned about protecting those forms of pay that are
critical to maintaining their standard of living than
they are about pay devoted to savings or nonessen-
tial expenses. Said another way, it would appear
that pay devoted to essential expenses (specifically
stable forms of pay) may play a more important
role in determining executive risk bearing than the
less stable forms of pay which are largely allocated
to nonessential use. This is exactly the opposite of
what most compensation scholars have predicted
about the role of compensation design and risk
bearing (see Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997, for
a review).
This conclusion is further echoed when we com-
pare the results associated with pay mix and those
of the downside risk measures. Traditionally, com-
pensation risk has been captured through measures
of pay mix that categorize different types of pay
into fixed and variable forms based on broad defi-
nitions of each type of pay. Although some schol-
ars have criticized this arbitrary classification of
pay as contrived (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989),
we go further and suggest that any definition of
compensation risk that exclusively focuses on pay
mix lacks external validity. As our results indi-
cate, real pay risk is the threat of loss, not just
uncertainty. Said another way, measures of down-
side risk of those forms of pay critical to one’s
standard of living may be more efficient at cap-
turing the theoretical construct of compensation
risk, a suggestion made years ago by Tosi and
Gomez-Mejia (1989). Alternatively, this finding
could also be interpreted as support for the idea
that the whole compensation package, and not just
the incentive portion, should be considered when
examining how compensation affects CEO behav-
ior (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).
In addition, we observe a positive association
between employment risk and risk taking. This
relation indicates that CEOs who perceived a
greater likelihood of termination were more likely
to engage in greater risk taking than CEOs who
perceived a lower chance of termination. This
result coincides with BAM’s prediction, where
employment risk represents a threat to all cur-
rent and future income (Amihud and Lev, 1981;
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987). This result con-
forms to research by Miller and Chen, who find
that ‘organizations performing poorly showed
increased risk as they neared bankruptcy’ (Miller
and Chen, 2004: 105).
One explanation for our results is that we
focused on categorizing respondents as facing ter-
mination only if they indicated that the perceived
threat to employment was ‘strong.’ Therefore, as
a final test, we substituted a continuous variable
for the dummy code to capture CEO employ-
ment risk. This continuous variable uses a seven-
point scale (’strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’)
and asks respondents to indicate the degree to
which they agree with the statement that they
believe their continued employment was threat-
ened. Although this variable again exhibits a posi-
tive association, its influence on risk-taking behav-
ior was not significant. This finding suggests that
the marginal influence of employment risk on risk
behavior increases as employment risk rises. This
finding supports the BAM view that agents are
likely to pursue risk when they anticipate losses
in perceived wealth. Given that employment repre-
sents all future income potential, perceived threats
to employment are likely to prompt significant
changes in behavior. The only remaining question
is whether this increase in risk taking corresponds
to improved performance, as assumed by some
compensation scholars, or results in deteriorating
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performance as suggested by Wiseman and Bromi-
ley (1996).
Finally, we developed a composite measure of
firm risk that recognizes the idiosyncratic nature of
strategic risk as well as the role of risk perception
in pursuing or avoiding risky actions. Incorpo-
rating risk perception is critical to distinguishing
between intentional and unintentional risk-taking
behavior, and corresponds to findings by Webber
and Milliman (1997), who find that controlling for
risk perception can eliminate the framing effect
on risk preference reversal. In contrast, our results
continue to find evidence of risk preference rever-
sals between differently framed conditions. Also,
by combining a variety of strategic actions, our
composite measure provides a superior measure of
a firm’s strategic risk profile in that it allows for
strategic flexibility across firms and encompasses a
variety of strategic postures. Specifically, it avoids
focusing on a single strategic dimension that may
be constrained not by choice but by exogenous fac-
tors that limit executive discretion (e.g., Hambrick
and Finkelstein, 1987). In sum, this measure rec-
ognizes the idiosyncratic multidimensional nature
of a firm’s strategic risk profile, while formally
incorporating individual perceptions of the risks
associated with those dimensions.
Limitations
Field research involving surveys of CEOs often
faces several issues that potentially could threaten
the reliability and validity of the study, includ-
ing response rates and common method bias.
Although our study faced similar problems, as
noted below, several procedures were enacted to
determine whether these issues biased our results.
First, our response rate was relatively low. As
described in the Methods section, however, we per-
formed numerous tests and none of them revealed
evidence of sample response bias. Despite this
lack of evidence, we must urge caution in draw-
ing conclusions from a small sample, and suggest
that future research consider ways of attracting
higher response rates from the population of inter-
est, namely CEOs.
Another potential problem is the use of a sin-
gle survey to capture many of the constructs of
interest, often referred to as common method bias.
When present, this bias creates a common or
shared variance among items on the survey that
can result in spurious associations. We conducted
several tests to check for this possibility and none
of them indicated the presence of common method
variance. Again, we believe that, although we rely
on a single instrument for much of our data, we
find little evidence to suggest it is a problem here.
However, we must again urge caution and suggest
that future research seek to replicate our findings
using multiple methods for gathering such data.
Also, it is worth noting that people may present
a limited capacity to remember past events, which
could affect their perceptions and become a poten-
tial biasing source. Although a thorough test of the
capacity of the CEOs in our sample to recall past
events is not possible with the data at hand, we
do not believe it systematically biases our results.
Firstly, we are not asking CEOs to report about
events that occurred many years ago but about con-
crete things in the very recent past (e.g., pay vari-
ability during the past 4 years). Besides, for this
issue to become a confounding factor in the test-
ing of the hypothesis, memory would have to be
biased in a particular way. We can not think of any
such biases in favor of the hypotheses so, if any-
thing, memory lapses would tend to attenuate the
strength of the observed empirical relationships.
We should also point out that whenever possible
we correlated the CEO’s response to archival data
(e.g., employment risk and ROA) and there was
convergence in the information sources.
Finally, the context of any field study can also
reflect an important exogenous influence that can
systematically bias findings. For example, the tim-
ing of the study may have influenced the per-
ception of compensation risk. The data for this
study were collected in 1998, which is toward
the end of the longest period of economic growth
in U.S. history. It may be that the ‘market exu-
berance’ of that period influenced perceptions of
compensation and specifically stock option value.
Although this is certainly possible, several stud-
ies done after the market decline of 2000–01 find
that an optimism bias regarding the valuation of
stock options continues to exist (Larcker and Lam-
bert, 2001; Devers, Wiseman, and Holmes, 2007).
Clearly, research that focuses on any economic
period must consider the potential bias this creates.
However, given the apparent durability of opti-
mism regarding the value of stock options, even in
a recessionary climate, we continue to believe that
our findings are robust across different economic
contexts.
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CONCLUSIONS
The present study extends the research on the risk-
taking consequences of compensation design in
the context of the CEO–shareholders agency rela-
tionship initiated by the work of Wiseman and
Gomez-Mejia (1998). In particular, it suggests a
disaggregation of risk bearing into three differ-
ent forms: employment risk: downside compensa-
tion risk; and pay variability. Although our results
provide empirical validation of the core ideas
expressed within BAM, this study goes further
in finding that risk bearing is multidimensional,
and that CEOs respond differently to each dimen-
sion of risk created within the principal–agent
contract. In addition, our results suggest that cap-
turing risk preferences using firm-level proxies
requires that we consider these proxies from the
perspective of actor before assigning risk attribu-
tions to these proxies. Although more research is
needed, it gives another step towards the develop-
ment of more ‘realistic’ models of CEO compen-
sation and behavior. Some of the empirical results
advanced here suggest interesting directions that
future research in executive compensation and cor-
porate governance should explore.
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